Ahmad Syafii Maarif: The odyssey of an Indonesian Muslim pluralist

Ahmad Syafii Maarif was not born pluralist. In fact, he had to travel all the way to the other side of the globe to find what he now believes in.

He discovered the true Koranic Islam, which encourages peaceful coexistence among humankind.

At the time, his age had already passed forty.

“I was late in many things,” confessed the 73-year-old Muslim intellectual, who recently won the prestigious Magsaysay Award for guiding Muslims to embrace tolerance and pluralism, speaking at his office in South Jakarta.

Years before he flew to the United States to study Islam and politics, Syafii was just an ordinary young man from a small, unknown district called Sumpur Kudus in West Sumatra.

Living in a quiet and poverty-stricken district, he never dreamed of becoming a Muslim leader, intellectual and champion of pluralism in the world’s largest Muslim country.

He thought he would probably end up becoming a trader just like many of his childhood friends, with whom he shared a romantic lifestyle in his idyllic village — farming, fishing in rivers and watching cow-fighting competitions.

His life took a twist when his senior, Sanusi Latief, took him to Java to continue his studies at Mu’allimin Yogyakarta, an Islamic boarding school run by Muhammadiyah, the country’s second largest Muslim organization.

At that time, Indonesia was a young, hopeful nation and was about to hold its first democratic elections in 1955.

Like many of his Muhammadiyah fellows and other intellectualized Muslims, including the late Nurcholis Madjid, Syafii was infatuated with the Islamic party Masyumi, which was led by the charismatic thinker Mohammad Natsir.

“I think I was a hardliner, but I never supported violence. I was a hardliner because I was fighting for the creation of an Islamic state, though at the time I believed it had to be carried through peacefully, using democratic methods,” he said.

“But that was part of my past.”

During those tumultuous years, Syafii, then a vigorous young activist, often wrote articles in magazines expressing his support for Masyumi, which later after studying in the United States he criticized for often failing to base its political decisions on valid and accurate sociological data.

When the party was disbanded, along with the demise of the Indonesian fledgling democracy, with the rise of Soekarno to almost-absolute power with his “Guided Democracy”, then Syafii still held onto the idea of an Islamic state as a panacea for all the troubles facing humankind.

He then brought the idea to the United States in the late 70s and early 80s, but only to discard it after encountering Pakistani thinker Fazlur Rahman — the most influential person in the development of Maarif’s Islamic and political thought, who was then a lecturer at Chicago University.

After attending his lectures for a few months, according to his autobiography, Syafii could no longer ask his rhetorical question, “Professor Rahman, please give me one fourth of your knowledge of Islam, and I will convert Indonesia into an Islamic state”.

It was during his discussions with Rahman that he was able to get off “the path of fundamentalism which was filled with flaming spirit but empty from deep, contemplative thoughts”.

“I have never found the term *Islamic state’ in the Koran or in any Islamic classical literature. This term was made in the twentieth century. If there is no reference to it in the primary sources of Islam, why do we have to fight for it?” he said.

Upon returning to Indonesia, many of the radicalized heirs of Masyumi were angry at him, accusing him of betraying the political ideas of Natsir and being an agent for the U.S. to weaken Islam from within.

“They don’t know Pak Natsir,” Syafii said.

This xenophobic allegation prevails until now, but he remains undeterred in fighting for what he believes in; mutual coexistence and social justice, which are far beyond the vague idea of an Islamic state or caliphate.

“The thought transformation occurred after a great intellectual struggle. We learned and contemplated deeply about Islam,” he said, referring to himself and other Muslim scholars.

He explained that Rahman actually never abandoned the idea of an Islamic state and that Syafii developed his own thoughts using the “ingredients” of Rahman’s progressive thoughts, known among academics as Islamic Neo Modernism.

Seeing himself as an intellectual-activist, Syafii stood between two great Indonesian Muslim scholars — the late Nurcholis Madjid, known as Cak Nur, and Amien Rais, both of whom were also students of Rahman in Chicago.

As an intellectual, he seems to be closer to Cak Nur, while as an activist, he had long been a close friend of Amien, his predecessor as chairman of Muhammadiyah.

Cak Nur passed away in 2005, while Amien turned to practical politics after the fall of the New Order, leaving his post in Muhammadiyah to Syafii.

“Amien has changed so much now; the three of us are intellectually getting closer,” he said.

Syafii not only abandoned the idea of an Islamic state. In the eyes of people who know him — regardless of their faiths — he is the icon of Islamic pluralism, a true defender of Pancasila and a beacon of hope for Indonesian democracy in which everybody, even atheists, can have equal rights.

Yet, he is aware of the challenges the country is now facing, such as extreme poverty, conservative edicts that are counterproductive to religious freedom and the exploitation of religious symbols for worldly purposes.

After leaving the Muhammadiyah leadership in 2005, he now has more freedom to respond to these challenges by regularly writing articles for a number of the media, just as he did when he was a young activist.

Unlike the elusive Cak Nur, Syafii is more blunt in expressing his opinions, believing that poverty is the mother of radicalism and seeing its eradication as crucial to curbing terrorism.

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), he suggests, has to be more progressive in seeing contemporary problems and be more contextual in issuing edicts.

At the same time, he will never stop criticizing the people who “praise Pancasila in words and betray it by their actions”.

What he has been doing, he humbly says, is insignificant compared to the prestige the Magsaysay Award has given to him.

Yet, Syafii has become a beacon of inspiration for the younger generation to foster tolerance and to combat bigotry in any form.

He praises young Indonesian Muslims as progressive, heralding a bright future for the country’s pluralism and democracy.

Islamic radicalism is ahistorical, he says, it has nothing to offer and its supporters are now suffering from internal conflicts.

“It is just a matter of time for the demise of the fundamentalist groups,” he said, optimistically.

Source: the Jakarta Post

RI becomes ‘more Intolerant’ (CSIS Report Survey)

The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Wed, 06/06/2012

A new survey published on Tuesday has once again confirmed the widely held assumption that religious intolerance is rising in the country.

The survey, conducted by the Jakarta-based think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) between Jan. 16 and 24 this year, found that although 83.4 percent of the respondents said that they had no problem with neighbors from different ethnic groups, 79.3 percent objected to inter-religious marriage.

The survey also found that 68.2 percent of respondents refused to allow people of different faiths to build places of worship in their neighborhood.

Of the total 2,220 respondents interviewed in 23 provinces, 91.5 percent said that people from different faiths must get approval from the local community before they could build a place of worship. The survey’s sample represents the plurality of the country’s population.

Close to 80 percent of respondents also thought that all restaurants and eateries should shut down during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan.

Most of the respondents in the survey also registered low levels of trust towards people of different faiths. More than 25 percent of the respondents said that they would not trust subscribers of different faiths, while 60 percent said that “they would be on guard”.

The survey also found that religious intolerance spread across party lines.

“No difference was seen between nationalist and Islamic party supporters. This means that party ideology, especially that of the nationalist parties, had failed to strike a chord with their supporters,” CSIS’ political and international relations director, Philips J. Vermonte, said at a press briefing.

A significant number of respondents also supported piety-oriented ordinances.

Close to 65 percent of respondents said they would approve a policy that would require female students to wear Muslim headscarves, while 61 percent of them would agree to an ordinance that would mandate students to be fluent in Arabic.

Philips said that the survey indicates that there was only little that the country gained in terms of religious harmony in the years after the downfall of the New Order regime.

“In spite of advances in democratization in the country after the fall of New Order regime, marked by three general elections in 14 years, there’s still a gap between political freedom and religious tolerance in daily life,” he said.

Philips said that the survey also challenged conventional wisdom that the government was the only party to blame for rising intolerance.

“The government is of course the one that should be responsible for promoting tolerance. But this survey shows that the problem lies also with society,” he said.

Contacted separately, Deputy Religious Affairs Minister Nasaruddin Umar acknowledged that there was indeed a trend towards religious intolerance, but he regretted the fact that CSIS released its findings, given that it could cause more trouble in the community.

“This will awaken the sleeping tiger,” he told The Jakarta Post.

Nasaruddin said that the world could get the wrong impression that the country’s majority Muslim population is responsible for the rise in intolerance.

Against this trend, Nasaruddin said that the ministry would step up its campaign to curb intolerance. “For instance we will keep an a close eye on books used in the [educational] curriculum. We will not tolerate any books that provoke religious conflicts,” he said.

University of Indonesia psychologist Ratih Ibrahim attributed rising intolerance to actions of groups and individuals who tried to benefit from communal conflicts.

“These parties seek certain gains, including political ones, by messing with our social harmony,” she said.

She said that if the trend continued, Indonesia could soon lose its bragging rights as a diverse nation. “We tell the world that we respect other religions and cultures, but the fact is that some groups are more dominant and we are now on the verge of a lawless society in spite of the fact that religion now plays a greater role,” she said.

Source: The Jakarta Post

The Place of Tolerance in Islam: On reading the Qur’an—and misreading it

Khaled Abou El Fadl

he terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon have focused public attention on the state of Muslim theology. For most Americans, the utter indifference to the value of human life and the unmitigated hostility to the United States shown by some Muslims came as a great shock. Others were confirmed in their belief that we face a great struggle between civilizations. Islamic values, they say, are fundamentally at odds with Western liberal values. The terrorist attacks are symptomatic of a clash between Judeo-Christian civilization, with its values of individual freedom, pluralism, and secularism, and an amoral, un-Westernized, so-called “authentic Islam.” Indeed, Islamic civilization is associated with the ideas of collective rights, individual duties, legalism, despotism, and intolerance that we associated with our former civilizational rival, the Soviet bloc. We seem to project onto the other everything we like to think that we are not.

This intellectual trap is easy to fall into when we deal with the theology of Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, and the Jihad organizations. The theologically-based attitudes of these Muslim puritans are fundamentally at odds not only with a Western way of life, but also with the very idea of an international society or the notion of universal human values. They display an intolerant exclusiveness, and a belligerent sense of supremacy vis-à-vis the other. According to their theologies, Islam is the only way of life, and must be pursued regardless of its impact on the rights and well-being of others. The straight path (al-sirat al-mustaqim) is fixed, they say, by a system of Divine laws (shari-ah) that trump any moral considerations or ethical values that are not fully codified in the law. God is manifested through a set of determinate legal commands that specify the right way to act in virtually all circumstances. The sole purpose of human life on earth is to realize the Divine manifestation by dutifully and faithfully implementing God’s law. Morality itself begins and ends in the mechanics and technicalities of Islamic law (though different schools of Islamic law understand the content of those laws differently).

A life devoted to compliance with this legal code is considered inherently superior to all others, and the followers of any other way are considered either infidels (kuffar), hypocrites (munafiqun), or iniquitous (fasiqun). Anchored in the security and assuredness of a determinable law, it becomes fairly easy to differentiate between the rightly-guided and the misguided. The rightly-guided obey the law; the misguided either deny, attempt to dilute, or argue about the law. Naturally, the rightly-guided are superior because they have God on their side. The Muslim puritans imagine that God’s perfection and immutability are fully attainable on earth—as if God’s perfection had been deposited in the Divine law, and, by giving effect to this law, we could create a social order that mirrors Divine Truth. By attaching themselves to the Supreme Being, puritan groups are able to claim a self-righteous perfectionism that easily slips into a pretense of supremacy.

Extremism in Islamic history

Perhaps all firmly held systems of belief, especially those founded on religious conviction, are in some way supremacist: believers are understood to have some special virtue that distinguishes them from adherents of other faiths. But the supremacist creed of the puritan groups is distinctive and uniquely dangerous. The supremacist thinking of Muslim puritans has a powerful nationalist component, which is strongly oriented towards cultural and political dominance. These groups are not satisfied with living according to their own dictates, but are actively dissatisfied with all alternative ways of life. They do not merely seek self-empowerment, but aggressively seek to disempower, dominate, or destroy others. The crux of the matter is that all lives lived outside the law are considered an offense against God that must be actively resisted and fought.

The existence of Muslim puritanism is hardly surprising. Most religious systems have suffered at one time or another from absolutist extremism, and Islam is no exception. Within the first century of Islam, religious extremists known as the Khawarij (literally, the secessionists) slaughtered a large number of Muslims and non-Muslims, and were even responsible for the assassination of the Prophet’s cousin and companion, the Caliph Ali b. Abi Talib. The descendants of the Khawarij exist today in Oman and Algeria, but after centuries of bloodshed, they became moderates if not pacifists. Similarly, the Qaramites and Assassins, for whom terror became a raison d’etre, earned unmitigated infamy in the writings of Muslim historians, theologians, and jurists. Again, after centuries of bloodshed, these two groups learned moderation, and they continue to exist in small numbers in North Africa and Iraq. The essential lesson taught by Islamic history is that extremist groups are ejected from the mainstream of Islam; they are marginalized, and eventually treated as heretical aberrations to the Islamic message.

But Islam is now living through a major shift, unlike any it has experienced in the past. The Islamic civilization has crumbled, and the traditional institutions that once sustained and propagated Islamic orthodoxy—and marginalized Islamic extremism—have been dismantled. Traditionally, Islamic epistemology tolerated and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of thought. The guardians of the Islamic tradition were the jurists (fuqaha), whose legitimacy rested largely on their semi-independence from a decentralized political system, and their dual function of representing the interests of the state to the laity and the interests of the laity to the state.

But in Muslim countries today, the state has grown extremely powerful and meddlesome, and is centralized in ways that were inconceivable two centuries ago. In the vast majority of Muslim countries, the state now controls the private religious endowments (awqaf ) that once sustained the juristic class. Moreover, the state has co-opted the clergy, and transformed them into its salaried employees. This transformation has reduced the clergy’s legitimacy, and produced a profound vacuum in religious authority. Hence, there is a state of virtual anarchy in modern Islam: it is not clear who speaks with authority on religious issues. Such a state of virtual religious anarchy is perhaps not problematic in secular societies where religion is essentially reduced to a private matter. But where religion remains central to the dynamics of public legitimacy and cultural meaning, the question of who represents the voice of God is of central significance.

Puritanism and Modern Islam

It would be wrong to say that fanatic supremacist groups such as the al-Qa’ida or al-Jihad organizations now fill the vacuum of authority in contemporary Islam. Though they are obviously able to commit highly visible acts of violence that command the public stage, fanatic groups remain sociologically and intellectually marginal in Islam. Still, they are extreme manifestations of more prevalent intellectual and theological currents in modern Islam.

Fanatic groups derive their theological premises from the intolerant puritanism of the Wahhabi and Salafi creeds. Wahhabism was founded by the eighteenth-century evangelist Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in the Arabian Peninsula. ‘Abd al-Wahhab sought to rid Islam of the corruptions that he believed had crept into the religion. He advocated a strict literalism in which the text became the sole source of legitimate authority, and displayed an extreme hostility to intellectualism, mysticism, and any sectarian divisions within Islam. According to the Wahhabi creed, it was imperative to return to a presumed pristine, simple, straightforward Islam, which could be entirely reclaimed by literal implementation of the commands of the Prophet, and by strict adherence to correct ritual practice. Importantly, Wahhabism rejected any attempt to interpret the divine law historically or contextually, with attendant possibilities of reinterpretation under changed circumstances. It treated the vast majority of Islamic history as a corruption of the true and authentic Islam. Furthermore, Wahhabism narrowly defined orthodoxy, and was extremely intolerant of any creed that contradicted its own.

In the late eighteenth century, the Al Sa’ud family united with the Wahhabi movement and rebelled against Ottoman rule in Arabia. The rebellions were very bloody because the Wahhabis indiscriminately slaughtered and terrorized Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Interestingly, mainstream jurists writing at the time, such as the Hanafi Ibn ‘Abidin and the Maliki al-Sawi, branded the Wahhabis the modern day Khawarij of Islam, and condemned their fanaticism and intolerance.¹ In 1818, Egyptian forces under the leadership of Muhammad Ali defeated this rebellion, and Wahhabism seemed destined to become another fringe historical experience with no lasting impact on Islamic theology. But the Wahhabi creed was resuscitated in the early twentieth century under the leadership of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud, who allied himself with Wahhabi militant rebels known as the Ikhwan, in the beginnings of what would become Saudi Arabia. Even with the formation of the Saudi state, Wahhabism remained a creed of limited influence until the mid-1970s when the sharp rise in oil prices, together with aggressive Saudi proselytizing, dramatically contributed to its wide dissemination in the Muslim world.

Wahhabism did not propagate itself as one school of thought or a particular orientation within Islam. Rather, it asserted itself as the orthodox “straight path” of Islam. By claiming literal fidelity to the Islamic text, it was able to make a credible claim to authenticity at a time when Islamic identity was contested. Moreover, the proponents of Wahhabism refused to be labeled or categorized as the followers of any particular figure including ‘Abd al-Wahhab himself. Its proponents insisted that they were simply abiding by the dictates of al-salaf al-salih (the rightly-guided predecessors, namely the Prophet and his companions), and in doing so, Wahhabis were able to appropriate the symbolisms and categories of Salafism.

Ironically, Salafism was founded in the early twentieth century by al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida as a liberal theological orientation. To respond to the demands of modernity, they argued, Muslims needed to return to the original sources of the Qur’an and Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet), and engage in de novo interpretations of the text. By the 1970s, however, Wahhabism had succeeded in transforming Salafism from a liberal modernist orientation to a literalist, puritan, and conservative theology. The sharp rise in oil prices in 1975 enabled Saudi Arabia, the main proponent of Wahhabism, to disseminate the Wahhabi creed under a Salafi guise, which purported to revert back to the authentic fundamentals of religion uncorrupted by the accretions of historical practice. In reality, however, Saudi Arabia projected its own fairly conservative cultural practices onto the textual sources of Islam and went on to proselytize these projections as the embodiment of Islamic orthodoxy.

Despite its intolerance and rigidity, however, Wahhabism itself does not bear primary responsibility for the existence of terrorist groups in Islam today. To be sure, Wahhabism and its militant offshoots share both attitudinal and ideological orientations. Both insist on a normative particularism that is fundamentally text-centered; both reject the notion of universal human values; and both deal with the other, however defined, in a functionalist and even opportunistic fashion. But Wahhabism is distinctively inward-looking—although focused on power, it primarily asserts power over other Muslims. This is consistent with its obsession with orthodoxy and correct ritualistic practice. Militant puritan groups, however, are both introverted and extroverted—they attempt to assert power against both Muslims and non-Muslims. As populist movements, they are a reaction to the disempowerment most Muslims have suffered in the modern age at the hands of harshly despotic governments, and at the hands of interventionist foreign powers. These groups compensate for extreme feelings of disempowerment by extreme and vulgar claims to power. Fueled by supremacist and puritan theological creeds, their symbolic acts of power become uncompromisingly fanatic and violent.

The Theology of Intolerance

Islamic puritans, whether of the Wahhabi or more militant varieties, offer a set of textual references in support of their exclusionary and intolerant theological orientation. For instance, they frequently cite the Qur’anic verse that states: “O’ you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as allies. They are allies of each other, and he amongst you who becomes their ally is one of them. Verily, God does not guide the unjust.”² Wahhabi and militant puritanism read this and similar Qur’anic verses literally and ahistorically, and therefore reach highly exclusionary conclusions. For example, while Muslims may elicit the support or aid of non-Muslims over particular issues when the self-interests of Muslims so require, they may not befriend or share the normative values of non-Muslims. This orientation often demands the performance of symbolic acts, which aim to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims—for instance, dressing in a particular way or marking non-Muslims with distinctive symbols.

Islamic puritanism also often invokes the Qur’anic verse asserting that, “whomsoever follows a religion other than Islam this will not be accepted from him, and in the Hereafter he will be among the losers.”³ This verse is invoked in arguing that the theology and rituals of Islam are the exclusive path to salvation. Moreover, a mere testament of faith or a general act of submission to God is insufficient to attain salvation in the Hereafter; rather, a person must comply with the particulars of the Divine law in order to qualify as a “true” believer. The puritan trend is thus uncompromising in its rejection of all forms of belief and ritual that do not qualify as the “true” religion of God.

As to the principles that should guide the interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims, the puritan trend cites the Qur’anic verse commanding Muslims to fight the unbelievers, “until there is no more tumult or oppression, and until faith and all judgment belongs to God.”⁴ Moreover, justifying an essentially supremacist view towards non-Muslims, proponents of puritanism often quote the following Qur’anic injunction: “Fight those among the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) who do not believe in God or the Hereafter, who do not forbid what God and His Prophet have forbidden, and who do not acknowledge the religion of truth—fight them until they pay the poll tax (jizyah) with willing submission and feel themselves subdued.”⁵

Relying on such textual evidence, Muslim puritans assert that Muslims are the inheritors of an objectively ascertainable and realizable Divine Truth; while Jews and Christians may be tolerated, they cannot be befriended. Ultimately, however, they must be subdued and forced to acknowledge Muslim supremacy by paying a poll tax. The puritan doctrine is not necessarily or entirely dismissive of the rights of non-Muslims, and it does not necessarily lead to the persecution of Jews and Christians. But it does assert a hierarchy of importance, and the commitment to toleration is correspondingly fragile and contingent. So it is conducive to an arrogance that can easily descend into a lack of respect or concern for the well-being or dignity of non-Muslims. When this arrogant orientation is coupled with textual sources that exhort Muslims to fight against unbelievers (kuffar), it can produce a radical belligerency.

The Place of Tolerance in Islam

The puritans construct their exclusionary and intolerant theology by reading Qur’anic verses in isolation, as if the meaning of the verses were transparent—as if moral ideas and historical context were irrelevant to their interpretation. In fact, however, it is impossible to analyze these and other verses except in light of the overall moral thrust of the Qur’anic message.

The Qur’an itself refers to general moral imperatives such as mercy, justice, kindness, or goodness. The Qur’an does not clearly define any of these categories, but presumes a certain amount of moral probity on part of the reader. For instance, the Qur’an persistently commands Muslims to enjoin the good. The word used for “the good” is ma’ruf, which means that which is commonly known to be good. Goodness, in the Qur’anic discourse, is part of what one may call a lived reality—it is the product of human experience and constructed normative understandings. Similarly, the Qur’anic term for kindness is ihsan, which literally means to beautify and improve upon. But beautification or improving upon can have meaning only in the context of a certain sociological understanding and practice.

In a further example, as to justice, the Qur’an states: “O you who believe, stand firmly for justice, as witnesses for God, even if it means testifying against yourselves, or your parents, or you kin, and whether it is against the rich or poor, for God prevails upon all. Follow not the lusts of your hearts, lest you swerve, and if you distort justice or decline to do justice, verily God knows what you do.”⁶ The idea that Muslims must stand up for justice even against their own self-interests is predicated on the notion that human beings are capable of achieving a high level of moral agency. As agents, Muslims are expected to achieve a level of moral conscientiousness, which they will bring to their relationship with God. In regards to every ethical obligation, the Qur’anic text assumes that readers will bring a pre-existing, innate moral sense to the text. Hence, the text will morally enrich the reader, but only if the reader will morally enrich the text. The meaning of the religious text is not fixed simply by the literal meaning of its words, but depends, too, on the moral construction given to it by the reader. So if the reader approaches the text without moral commitments, it will almost inevitably yield nothing but discrete, legalistic, technical insights.

Similarly, it is imperative to analyze the historical circumstances in which specific Qur’anic ethical norms were negotiated. Many of the institutions referenced in the Qur’an—such as the poll tax or the formation of alliances with non-Muslims—can be understood only if the reader is aware of the historical practices surrounding the revelation of the text. By emptying the Qur’an both of its historical and moral context, the puritan trend ends up transforming the text into a long list of morally non-committal legal commands.

The Qur’anic discourse, for instance, can readily support an ethic of diversity and tolerance. The Qur’an not only expects, but even accepts the reality of difference and diversity within human society: “O humankind, God has created you from male and female and made you into diverse nations and tribes so that you may come to know each other. Verily, the most honored of you in the sight of God is he who is the most righteous.”⁷ Elsewhere, the Qur’an asserts that diversity is part of the Divine intent and purpose in creation: “If thy Lord had willed, He would have made humankind into a single nation, but they will not cease to be diverse… And, for this God created them [humankind].”⁸ The classical commentators on the Qur’an did not fully explore the implications of this sanctioning of diversity, or the role of peaceful conflict resolution in perpetuating the type of social interaction that would result in people “knowing each other.” Nor does the Qur’an provide specific rules or instructions about how “diverse nations and tribes” are to acquire such knowledge. In fact, the existence of diversity as a primary purpose of creation, as suggested by the verse above, remained underdeveloped in Islamic theology. Pre-modern Muslim scholars did not have a strong incentive to explore the meaning and implications of the Qur’anic endorsement of diversity and cross-cultural intercourse. This is partly because of the political dominance and superiority of the Islamic Civilization, which left Muslim scholars with a sense of self-sufficient confidence. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Islamic civilization was pluralistic and unusually tolerant of various social and religious denominations. Working out the implications of a commitment to human diversity and mutual knowledge under contemporary conditions requires moral reflection and attention to historical circumstance: precisely what is missing from puritan theology and doctrine.

Other than a general endorsement of human diversity, the Qur’an also accepted the more specific notion of a plurality of religious beliefs and laws. Although the Qur’an clearly claims that Islam is the Divine Truth, and demands belief in Muhammad as the final messenger in a long line of Abrahamic prophets, it does not completely exclude the possibility that there might be other paths to salvation. The Qur’an insists on God’s unfettered discretion to accept in His mercy whomever He wishes. In a rather remarkable set of passages that, again, have not been adequately theorized by Muslim theologians, the Qur’an recognizes the legitimate multiplicity of religious convictions and laws. In one such passage, for example, the Qur’an asserts: “To each of you God has prescribed a Law and a Way. If God would have willed, He would have made you a single people. But God’s purpose is to test you in what he has given each of you, so strive in the pursuit of virtue, and know that you will all return to God [in the Hereafter], and He will resolve all the matters in which you disagree.”⁹ On this and other occasions the Qur’an goes on to state that it is possible for non-Muslims to attain the blessing of salvation: “Those who believe, those who follow Jewish scriptures, the Christians, the Sabians, and any who believe in God and the Final Day, and do good, all shall have their reward with their Lord and they will not come to fear or grief.”¹⁰ Significantly, this passage occurs in the same chapter that instructs Muslims not to take the Jews and Christians as allies. How can these different verses be reconciled?

If we read the text with moral and historical guidance, we can see the different passages as part of a complex and layered discourse about reciprocity and its implications in the historical situation in Mohammed’s Medina. In part, the chapter exhorts Muslims to support the newly established Muslim community in Medina. But its point is not to issue a blanket condemnation against Jews and Christians (who “shall have their reward with their Lord”). Instead, it accepts the distinctiveness of the Jewish and Christian communities and their laws, while also insisting that Muslims are entitled to the same treatment as those other communities. Thus it sets out an expectation of reciprocity for Muslims: while calling upon Muslims to support the Prophet of Islam against his Jewish and Christian detractors, it also recognizes the moral worth and rights of the non-Muslim “other.”

The challenge most often invoked against an argument for tolerance in Islam is the issue of jihad. Jihad, especially as portrayed in the Western media, is often associated with the idea of a holy war that is propagated in the name of God against the unbelievers. Therefore, jihad is often equated with the most vulgar images of religious intolerance.

At the most rudimentary level, the Qur’an itself is explicit in prohibiting any form of coerced conversions to Islam. It contends that truth and falsity are clear and distinct, and so whomever wishes to believe may do so, but no duress is permitted in religion: “There is no compulsion in matter of faith.”¹¹ Of course, this response is incomplete—even if forced conversions to Islam are prohibited, aggressive warfare to spread Islamic power over non-believers might still be allowed. Does the Qur’an condone such expansionist wars?

Interestingly, Islamic tradition does not have a notion of holy war. “Jihad” simply means to strive hard or struggle in pursuit of a just cause, and according to the Prophet of Islam, the highest form of jihad is the struggle waged to cleanse oneself from the vices of the heart. Holy war (in Arabic al-harb al-muqaddasah) is not an expression used by the Qur’anic text or Muslim theologians. In Islamic theology, war is never holy; it is either justified or not, and if it is justified, those killed in battle are considered martyrs. The Qur’anic text does not recognize the idea of unlimited warfare, and does not consider the simple fact of the belligerent’s Muslim identity to be sufficient to establish the justness of his cause. In other words, the Qur’an entertains the possibility that the Muslim combatant might be the unjust party in a conflict.

Moreover, while the Qur’an emphasizes that Muslims may fight those who fight them, it also insists that Muslims may not transgress.¹² Transgression is an ambiguous term, but on several occasions the Qur’an intimates that in order not to transgress, Muslims must be constrained by a requirement of proportionality, even when the cause is just. For instance, it states, “Mandated is the law of equality, so that who transgresses against you, respond in kind, and fear God, and know that God is with those who exercise restraint.”¹³

Despite the prohibition against transgression and the condemnation of unlimited warfare, many classical jurists adopted an imperialist orientation, which divided the world into the abode of Islam and the abode of war, and supported expansionist wars against unbelievers. But this view was not unanimous. Classical Muslim jurists debated whether unbelief is a sufficient justification for warfare, with a sizeable number of classical jurists arguing that non-Muslims may not be fought unless they pose a physical threat to Muslims. If non-Muslims seek peace, Muslims should make an effort to achieve such a peace. This discourse was partly inspired by the Qur’anic injunctions concerning peace. The Qur’an asserts that God does not prohibit Muslims from making peace with those who do not fight Muslims, but God does prohibit Muslims from making peace with those who have expelled Muslims from their homes and continue to persecute them.¹⁴ Elsewhere, the Qur’an pronounces a stronger mandate in favor of peace in stating: “If your enemy inclines towards peace, then you should seek peace and trust in God.”¹⁵ Moreover, the Qur’an instructs Muslims not to haughtily turn away unbelievers who seek to make peace with Muslims, and reminds Muslims that, “If God would have willed, He would have given the unbelievers power over you [Muslims], and they would have fought you [Muslims]. Therefore, if they [the unbelievers] withdraw from you and refuse to fight you, and instead send you guarantees of peace, know that God has not given you a license [to fight them].”¹⁶ These discussions of peace would not make sense if Muslims were in a permanent state of war with non-believers, and if non-believers were a permanent enemy and always a legitimate target.

The other major issue on the point of tolerance in Islam is that of the poll tax (jizyah) imposed on the People of Book (Christians and Jews) who live in Muslim territory. When the Qur’an was revealed, it was common inside and outside of Arabia to levy poll taxes against alien groups. Building upon the historical practice, classical Muslim jurists argued that the poll tax is money collected by the Islamic polity from non-Muslims in return for the protection of the Muslim state. If the Muslim state was incapable of extending such protection to non-Muslims, it was not supposed to levy a poll tax. In fact, ‘Umar (r. 13-23/634-644), the second Rightly-Guided Caliph and close companion of the Prophet, returned the poll tax to an Arab Christian tribe that he was incapable of protecting from Byzantine aggression.

Aside from the juristic theory justifying the poll tax, the Qur’an does not, however, pronounce an absolute and unwavering rule in favor of such an institution. Once more, attention to historical circumstance is essential. The Qur’an endorsed a poll tax as a response to particular groups in Arabia who were persistently hostile to the early Muslims. Importantly, the Prophet did not collect a poll tax from every non-Muslim tribe that submitted to Muslim sovereignty, and in fact, in the case of a large number of non-Muslim but non-hostile tribes, he paid them a periodic sum of money or goods. These tribes were known as “those whose hearts have been reconciled.” Furthermore, ‘Umar entered into a peace settlement with Arab Christian tribes pursuant to which these tribes were obligated to pay the Islamic annual tax known as the zakah (almsgiving), and not the poll tax. Reportedly, although they refused to convert to Islam, the Christian tribes contended that paying the jizyah (poll tax) was degrading, and instead, asked to pay the zakah, and ‘Umar accommodated their request.¹⁷

In short, there are various indicators that the poll tax is not a theologically mandated practice, but a functional solution that was adopted in response to a specific set of historical circumstances. Only an entirely ahistorical reading of the text could conclude that it is an essential element in a Divinely-sanctioned program of subordinating the non-believer.

Final Thoughts

Ultimately, the Qur’an, or any text, speaks through its reader. This ability of human beings to interpret texts is both a blessing and a burden. It is a blessing because it provides us with the flexibility to adapt texts to changing circumstances. It is a burden because the reader must take responsibility for the normative values he or she brings to the text. Any text, including those that are Islamic, provides possibilities for meaning, not inevitabilities. And those possibilities are exploited, developed and ultimately determined by the reader’s efforts—good faith efforts, we hope—at making sense of the text’s complexities. Consequently, the meaning of the text is often only as moral as its reader. If the reader is intolerant, hateful, or oppressive, so will be the interpretation of the text.

It would be disingenuous to deny that the Qur’an and other Islamic sources offer possibilities of intolerant interpretation. Clearly these possibilities are exploited by the contemporary puritans and supremacists. But the text does not command such intolerant readings. Historically, Islamic civilization has displayed a remarkable ability to recognize possibilities of tolerance, and to act upon these possibilities. Islamic civilization produced a moral and humanistic tradition that preserved Greek philosophy, and generated much science, art, and socially benevolent thought. Unfortunately, however, the modern puritans are dissipating and wasting this inspiring moral tradition. They are increasingly shutting off the possibilities for a tolerant interpretation of the Islamic tradition.

If we assess the moral trajectory of a civilization in light of its past record, then we have ample reason to be optimistic about the future. But the burden and blessing of sustaining that moral trajectory—of accentuating the Qur’anic message of tolerance and openness to the other—falls squarely on the shoulders of contemporary Muslim interpreters of the tradition.

¹ Muhammad Amin Ibn ‘Abidin, Hashiyat Radd al-Muhtar (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi 1966), 6:413; Ahmad al-Sawi, Hashiyat al-Sawi ‘ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, n.d.), 3 :307-308. See also Ahmad Dallal, “The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 113/3 (1993), who demonstrates that Wahhabism in the nineteenth century was considered a fringe fanatic group.

² Qur’an 5:51.

³ Qur’an 3:85.

⁴ Qur’an 8:39.

⁵ Qur’an 9:29.

⁶ Qur’an 4:135.

⁷ Qur’an 49:13.

⁸ Qur’an 11:118-9.

⁹ Qur’an 5:49.

¹⁰ Qur’an 5:69; 2:62.

¹¹ Qur’an 2:256; 10:99; 18:29.

¹² Qur’an 2:190; 5:2.

¹³ Qur’an 2:194.

¹⁴ Qur’an 60:9.

¹⁵ Qur’an 8:61.

¹⁶ Qur’an 4:90. Also 4:94.

¹⁷ Abu Zakariyya al-Nawawi, Rawdat al-Talibin, 3rd edition, edited by Zuhayr al-Shawish (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1991), 10:316-317

Khaled Abou El Fadl is the Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at UCLA and author of Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law.

Source: www.bostonreview.net

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON TOLERANCE, 1995

Introduction

On the initiative of UNESCO, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1995 the United Nations Year for Tolerance and designated UNESCO as lead agency for this Year. In conformity with its mandate and in order to call public attention worldwide to the urgent matter of tolerance, the General Conference of UNESCO solemnly adopted on 16 November 1995, the 50th anniversary of the signature of UNESCO’s Constitution, the Declaration of the Principles of Tolerance. The Member States of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, meeting in Paris at the twenty-eighth session of the General Conference, from 25 October to 16 November 1995.

Preamble

Bearing in mind that the United Nations Charter states “We, the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, … to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person… and for these ends to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.”

Recalling that the Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO adopted on 16 November 1945, states that “peace, it it is not to fail, must be founded on the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.”

Recalling also that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that “Everyone has the right to freedom of though, conscience and religion” (Article 18), “of opinion and expression” (Article 19), and that education “should promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups” (Article 26),

Noting relevant international instruments including:
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and regional instrumnents,
the Convention on the Elimination of Any Form of Discrimination against Women,
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
the Declaration on the Elimination of Any Form of Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief
the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
the Declaration on measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights
the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Summit for Social Development
the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice,
the UNESCO Convention and Recommnendation against Discrimination in Education,

Bearing in mind the objectives of the Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the World Decade Human Rights Education, and the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People,

Taking into consideration the recomendations of regional conferences organized in the framework of the United Nations Year for Tolerance in accordance with UNESCO General Conference 27C/Resolution 5.14, as well as the conclusions and recommendations of other conferences and meetings organized by Member States within the programme of the United Nations Year for Tolerance,

Alarmed by the current rise in acts of intolerance, violence, terrorism, xenophobia, aggressive nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, exclusion, marginalization and discrimination directed against national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, refugees, migrant workers, immigrants and vulnerable groups within societies, as well as acts of violence and intimidation committed against individuals exercising their freedom of opinion and expression – all of which threaten the consolidation of peace and democracy both nationally and internationally and which are all obstacles to development,

Emphasising the responsibilities of Member States to develop and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, gender, language, national origin, religion or disability, and to combat intolerance,

Adopt and solemnly proclaim this Declaration of Principles on Tolerance.

Resolving to take all positive measures necessary to promote tolerance in our societies, because tolerance is not only a cherished principle, but also a necessity for peace and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

We declare the following:

Article 1 – Meaning of tolerance

1.1 Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.

1.2 Tolerance is not concession, condescension or indulgence. Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. In no circumstance can it be used to justify infringements of these fundamental values. Tolerance is to be exercised by individuals, groups and States.

1.3 Tolerance is the responsibility that upholds human rights, pluralism (including cultural pluralism), democracy and the rule of law. It involves the rejection of dogmatism and absolutism and affirms the standards set out in international human rights instruments.

1.4 Consistent with respect for human rights, the practice of tolerance does not mean toleration of social injustice or the abandonment or weakening of one’s convictions. It means that one is free to adhere to one’s own convictions and accepts that others adhere to theirs. It means accepting the fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their appearance, situation, speech, behaviour and values, have the right to live in peace and to be as they are. It also means that one’s views are not to be imposed on others.

Article 2 – State level

2.1 Tolerance at the State level requires just and impartial legislation, law enforcement and judicial and administrative process. It also requires that economic and social opportunities be made available to each person without any discrimination. Exclusion and marginalization can lead to frustration, hostility and fanaticism .

2.2. In order to achieve a more tolerant society, States should ratify existing international human rights conventions, and draft new legislation where necessary to ensure equality of treatment and of opportunity for all groups and individuals in society.

2.3 It is essential for international harmony that individuals, communities and nations accept and respect the multicultural character of the human family. Without tolerance there can be no peace, and without peace there can be no development or democracy.

2.4 Intolerance may take the form of marginalization of vulnerable groups and their exclusion from social and political participation, as well as violence and discrimination against them. As confirmed in the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice “All individuals and groups have the right to be different” (Article 1.2).

Article 3 – Social dimensions

3.1 In the modern world, tolerance is more essential than ever before. It is an age marked by the globalization of the economy and by rapidly increasing mobility, communication, integration and interdependence, large-scale migrations and displacement of populations, urbanization and changing social patterns. Since every part of the world is characterized by diversity, escalating intolerance and strife potentially menaces every region. It is not confined to any country, but is a global threat.

3.2 Tolerance is necessary between individuals and at the family and community levels. Tolerance promotion and the shaping of attitudes of openness, mutual listening and solidarity should take place in schools and universities, and through non-formal education, at home and in the workplace. The communication media are in a position to play a constructive role in facilitating free and open dialogue and discussion, disseminating the values of tolerance, and highlighting the dangers of indifference towards the rise in intolerant groups and ideologies.

3.3 As affirmed by the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, measures must be taken to ensure equality in dignity and rights for individuals and groups wherever necessary. In this respect, particular attention should be paid to vulnerable groups which are socially or economically disadvantaged so as to afford them the protection of the laws and social measures in force, in particular with regard to housing, employment and health, to respect the authenticity of their culture and values, and to facilitate their social and occupational advancement and integration, especially through education.

3.4 Appropriate scientific studies and networking should be undertaken to co-ordinate the international community’s response to this global challenge, including analysis by the social sciences of root causes and effective countermeasures, as well as research and monitoring in support of policy-making and standard-setting action by Member States.

Article 4 – Education

4.1 Education is the most effective means of preventing intolerance. The first step in tolerance education is to teach people what their shared rights and freedoms are, so that they may be respected, and to promote the will to protect those of others.

4.2 Education for tolerance should be considered an urgent imperative; that is why it is necessary to promote systematic and rational tolerance teaching methods that will address the cultural, social, economic, political and religious sources of intolerance – major roots of violence and exclusion. Education policies and programmes should contribute to development of understanding, solidarity and tolerance among individuals as well as among ethnic, social, cultural, religious and linguistic groups and nations.

4.3 Education for tolerance should aim at countering influences that lead to fear and exclusion of others, and should help young people to develop capacities for independent judgement, critical thinking and ethical reasoning.

4.4 We pledge to support and implement programmes of social science research and education for tolerance, human rights and non-violence. This means devoting special attention to improving teacher training, curricula, the content of textbooks and lessons, and other educational materials including new educational technologies, with a view to educating caring and responsible citizens open to other cultures, able to appreciate the value of freedom, respectful of human dignity and differences, and able to prevent conflicts or resolve them by nonviolent means.

Article 5 – Commitment to action

We commit ourselves to promoting tolerance and non-violence through programmes and institutions in the fields of education science, culture and communication.

Article 6 – International Day for Tolerance

In order to generate public awareness, emphasize the dangers of intolerance and react with renewed commitment and action in support of tolerance promotion and education, we solemnly proclaim 16 November the annual International Day for Tolerance.

———————–

Adopted by acclamation on 16 November 1985 at the twenty-eighth session of the UNESCO General Conference.

Source: UNESCO

Rapporteur’s Digest on Freedom of Religion or Belief

Excerpts of the Reports from 1986 to 2011 by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Arranged by Topics of the Framework for Communications

 

The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief is an independent expert appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council. The mandate holder has been invited to identify existing and emerging obstacles to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief and present recommendations on ways and means to overcome such obstacles.
Historical background
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed further to resolution 1986/20 a ―Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance‖. In 2000, the Commission on Human Rights decided to change the mandate title to ―Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief‖, which was subsequently endorsed by ECOSOC decision 2000/261 and welcomed by General Assembly resolution 55/97. On 18 June 2010, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 14/11 which, inter alia, extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for a further period of three years.

Unduh selengkapnya DI SINI

OIC, human rights and Indonesia’s Role

The Jakarta Post, 24 Feb 2012 | Yuyun Wahyuningrum and Muhammad Hafiz

Jakarta is witnessing the historical moment of hosting the first meeting of the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Feb. 20-24, 2012.

IPHRC was established during the 38th Ministerial Meeting of OIC in Astana, Kazakhstan in June last year with the adoption of resolution No. 2/38-LEG on “the Establishment of the OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission”.

In this meeting, foreign ministers of 57 countries selected 18 experts representing three regions: Asia, Africa and the Middle East to sit as commissioners in the IPHRC for three years. Experts representing Asia are Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin (Indonesia), Raihana Abdullah (Malaysia), Abdul Wahab (Pakistan) and Asila Wardak (Afghanistan).

During their five-day meeting in Jakarta, IPHRC would discuss household issues such as the secretariat of IPHRC, Rules of Procedures (ROP), structure of the Commission and elaboration of the Commission’s scope of work to include civil and political rights, the PalestineIsrael conflict, right to development, women and children’s rights, interfaith dialogue and the situation of Muslim minorities in the world.

As a new system, the Commission should also start discussing its strategic position among the existing human rights systems. As a matter of importance, IPHRC should not duplicate or compete with the other mechanisms.

Rather, it should complement, add values and strengthen each other’s mandates and roles in the respect, protect and fulfillment of human rights. IPHRC also should ensure involvement of the vulnerable and marginal groups in its deliberations.

OIC has been silent in global human rights debates since the adoption of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) in 1991. The creation of the IPHRC was part of institutional reform in OIC and a landmark of paradigm shift in the Islamic world on human rights.

In 2005, the third Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference adopted the Ten-year Program of Action (TYPA), which included the initiatives to institutionalize human rights in this Islamic political body.

In 2008, the new OIC included the creation of IPHRC in its new charter and adopted the Plan of Action for the Advancement of Women (OPAAW).

At the international level, OIC sponsors the formulation of the Resolution on Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief during the 16th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in March 2011.

Now, OIC is at the half-way stage in implementing its institutional reform plan. To what extent OIC is loyal to the universal human rights principles remains a big question at the moment, and begs explanation and evidence. More importantly is to answer how this reform is relevant to its Ummah to meet challenges in the 21st century as TYPA envisions.

Spokesperson of OIC said that the establishment of the IPHRC should be part of the solution instead of the problem. IPHRC was created to act independently and function as an advisory committee of the OIC on human rights matters.

In fact, during the Civil Society’s Forum to the First Meeting of the IPHRC that was organized by a Coalition for IPHRC Advocacy on Feb. 9, 2012, in Jakarta, Indonesia’s civil society expressed concern that the Commission would be used to legitimate the reduction of the interpretation of universal human rights principles.

This concern may be valid as Article 15 of the Charter of OIC states that IPHRC “shall promote the civil, political, social and economic rights enshrined in the organization’s covenants and declarations and in universally agreed human rights instruments, in conformity with Islamic values”.

At the same time, IPHRC can be a strategic venue to seek an alternative solution when it comes to crossregional issues such as protection of the rights of migrant workers.

OIC consists of members coming from three regional human rights systems, namely the African Commission for Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the Arab League.

Middle East countries have been the primary destination of Indonesian migrant workers. There are about 1.5-1.7 million Indonesian migrant workers in the Middle East countries (Antara, Nov. 28, 2011).

Perhaps, the model of multiregional cooperation on upholding the rights of migrant workers is the answer to the complexity of the issue.

Indonesia’s membership in IPHRC enforces the leadership projection as the world’s third-largest democracy and as a moderate Muslim-majority country.

From 2005 on, Indonesia has been trying to convince the world that it is country is a place where democracy and human rights, Islam and modernity can go hand in hand.

Can Indonesia challenge OIC’S tradition position of being conservative Islam?

First, it is worth noting that economically, Indonesia’s bargaining power is inadequate to influence the decisions of the OIC. Logistically, Indonesia has no physical representation in the OIC headquarters in Saudi Arabia to deal specifically with OIC multi-lateral cooperation.

Second, there has been a relative neglect of Indonesia’s Islamic credentials. Apart from the fact that Indonesia never declares itself an Islamic country; its Islam is not the way it is supposed to be.

Being moderate Islam, Indonesia has the superior authority to inform OIC in its reform process, which brings the motto of “moderation and modernization”.

Democratic transition in Indonesia has changed the country from being the target of scrutiny for alleged human rights abuses to a more responsible international player.

This should give added values to OIC in promoting human rights.

OIC and IPHRC need to work hard to gain credibility from its members, the international community and the Muslim population around the world.

Selecting the host of IPHRC is an important and political aspect to show OIC’S genuine intentions on human rights. It is expected that Jakarta will be chosen over Jeddah and Tehran in the next Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in May 2012 in Djibouti.

The writers work for the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), a network of 50 organizations working on human rights in Indonesia for international human rights advocacy, based in Jakarta.